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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, President Bush signed the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act' [hereinafter the ADA] heralding the Act as a historic
opportunity:
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of per-
sons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As the Declara-
tion of Independence has been a beacon for people all over the world seeking
freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise
come to be a model for the choices and opportunities of future generations
around the world.2
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Teresa A. Schneider, Creighton University, B.A., 1996 (summa cum laude);
University of Nebraska College of Law, J.D., 1999; Executive Editor, Nebraska
Law Review, 1998.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602. Others similarly viewed this bill as a uniquely historic
opportunity. Senator Harkin declared,
the ADA is about abilities, not disabilities. It is about unleashing the
talents, skills, enthusiasms and commitment of 43 million Americans
who want to contribute but are denied basic access that will enable them
to contribute to society. With the passage of this historic legislation, this
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He maintained that fears about the alleged vagueness of the ADA, or
that it would lead to a litigation explosion were "misplaced."3 Eight
years have passed since the ADA was enacted and th e warning cries of
statutory vagueness have become all too real as revealed in conflicting
litigation concerning the ADA's application to HIV-positive
individuals.4
The ADA's definition of disability can be blamed for some of these
problems. The ADA defines disability as "(A) a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment."5 The definition mir-
rors the definition of "handicapped" used in the Rehabilitation Act of
20th century emancipation proclamation for people with disabilities, we
will deny them that opportunity no longer.
135 CONG. REc. S10708-01 (1989)(statement of Sen. Harkin).
3. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 601. Congressional debates indicate some reservation about
the apparently vague nature of the ADA. Although Senator Armstrong voted for
the legislation, he noted his reluctance, calling the ADA's disability definition
"vague and elastic." He concluded,
[t]he bill is a legislative Rorschach test, an inkblot whose meaning and
significance will be-determined through years of costly litigation. While
I voted for this bill because I believe that the rights of people with disa-
bilities must be protected, I did so with the awareness that it will engen-
der wave upon wave of court rulings that will extend the bill far beyond
its intended purposes.
136 CoNG. REC. S9694 (1990)(statement of Sen. Armstrong). See also 136 CONG.
REC. H2421-02 (1990)(statement of Rep. Burton)("The problem is the bill has
some major, major problems that are going to lead to chaos, I think, in some
areas down the road.")
4. The focus of this Note is primarily the Bragdon decision in which the United
States Supreme Court held that an asymptomatic HIV-positive woman is dis-
abled under the ADA. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). For general
comment about the issues in the Bragdon case and a discussion of the duty of
health care providers to treat HIV-positive patients, see John Gibeaut, Filling a
Need, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 48. Gibeaut's article concerns the First Circuit's
decision rendered inAbbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Other cases in accordance with Bragdon include Hernandez v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997)(HIV-positive
employee disabled because he had a physical impairment which substantially
limited the major life activities of reproduction and caring for himself); Anderson
v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996)(AIDS
is a per se disability under the ADA); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.
Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994)(attorney infected with HIV disabled under the ADA).
Compare Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N-A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997)(asymptomatic HIV-positive individual not disabled under the ADA); Cortes
v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. N.C. 1996)(HIV-positive person not
disabled under the ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53
F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995)(HIV-positive infection does not constitute a per se ADA
disability).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
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1973 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.6 Rather than
definitively listing disabilities in the Act, an individualized inquiry is
required. 7
Because much of the case law centers on the first prong of the disa-
bility definition, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities . . .s, this Note likewise
focuses on the first section of the definition. In the cases involving
asymptomatic9 HIV-positive persons who are asserting an ADA claim,
the issue typically is: If the plaintiff is asymptomatic, how can he or
she have a major life activity substantially limited? According to the
Center for Disease Control (CDC), the number of HIV-positive Ameri-
cans is as high as 900,000; and an estimated half of those are unaware
of their infection.i 0 Given the large numbers infected, the application
of the ADA to asymptomatic HIV-positive persons has far-reaching
consequences.
Bragdon v. Abbottl provides an explanation to the seeming con-
tradiction of how an asymptomatic person can have a major life activ-
ity substantially limited. In Bragdon, the plaintiff, Sidney Abbott,
was an asymptomatic HIV-positive patient of a Maine dentist, Randon
Bragdon. Pursuant to an infectious disease policy, Bragdon told Ab-
bott that he would fill her cavity in the hospital, not his office.
Although his fee would remain the same, she would be required to pay
any additional hospital charges. She refused and filed a complaint
under the ADA.12 The U.S. District Court in Maine granted summary
judgment for Abbott.13 Bragdon appealed, but the First Circuit af-
firmed the grant of summary judgment. The First Circuit agreed that
Abbott was indeed disabled because her impairment of HIV infection
substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction. She was
limited in this major life activity because she feared passing the infec-
6. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III), at 26-27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
449-50. For further discussion on the definition of disability, see Amalia Magda-
lena Villalba, Comment, Defining "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 22 U. BALT. L. REv. 357 (1993).
7. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1997);
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir.
1995).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
9. An asymptomatic person presents no symptoms of her disease. See WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 111 (9th ed. 1991).
10. See Chandler Burr, The ADS Exception: Privacy v. Public Health, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, June 1997, at 61.
11. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
12. See id. at 2201; see also Gibeaut, supra note 4, at 50 (noting the additional costs
of treatment in the hospital would increase the price of the filling procedure from
$35 to almost $200).
13. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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tion to the child, impairing her own immune system through preg-
nancy, 14 and finally, because she feared that she might not live long
enough to finish raising the child.15 The court rejected the dentist's
direct threat defense, holding that "Dr. Bragdon has failed to present
meaningfully probative evidence that treating Ms. Abbott would have
posed a medically significant risk to his health or safety."16
Bragdon appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which va-
cated the First Circuit's decision and remanded on the direct threat
issue.1 7 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that HIV infection,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a disability under the ADA
because it is a physical or mental impairment which substantially lim-
its the major life activity of reproduction.1 8 HIV infection impairs the
hemic and lymphatic systems, thus meeting the physical or mental
impairment requirement.' 9 According to the Supreme Court, repro-
duction is a major life activity because of its significance. 20 The Court
found that Abbott was substantially limited in her reproductive activi-
ties because of the risk of HIV transmission during sexual relations
and during gestation and childbirth.21
This Note will point out the problems with the Bragdon decision
and ultimately argue that an asymptomatic HIV-positive person is not
disabled under the first definition of disability contained in the ADA;
that is, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual."22 An asymp-
tomatic HIV-positive individual is not disabled within that definition
because, even though he or she suffers from a physical impairment,
the impairment does not substantially limit any major life activity.2 3
Although this Note rejects the argument that reproduction is a major
life activity2 4 even assuming arguendo that reproduction is a major
14. However, this fear of impairing one's immune system through pregnancy does
not clearly appear to be medically legitimate. See Banks, infra note 114, at 63
n.33.
15. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 554
(1998).
16. Id. at 948-49.
17. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
18. See id. at 2207.
19. See id. at 2204.
20. See id. at 2205.
21. See id. at 2206-07.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
23. For an argument that asymptomatic HIV infection is a handicap under the Reha-
bilitation Act, see Robert A- Kushen, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus
as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 563
(1988).
24. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Bragdon, federal courts were divided over
the issue of reproduction as a major life activity. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med.
Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996), and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), both hold that reproduction is not a major life activity
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life activity within the meaning of the ADA, the ability to reproduce is
not substantially limited. Any limitation comes not from the physical
impairment itself, but from the individual's reaction to the disease.2 5
II. BACKGROUND
When Plaintiff Sidney Abbott went to defendant Dr. Randon Brag-
don's office for a dental visit on September 16, 1994, she had been HIV
positive for eight years.26 She indicated her status on the patient re-
gistration form and was asymptomatic at the time. When Dr. Brag-
don discovered that Ms. Abbott had a cavity, he informed her that he
would treat her in the hospital, rather than at his office, pursuant to
his infectious disease policy. Although he would charge his regular
fee, Abbott would be responsible for any additional hospital costs. She
refused and filed suit under the ADA.27
The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ab-
bott, finding that she was disabled as a matter of law.28 Using the
first prong of the disability definition, the District Court concluded
that asymptomatic HIV infection does constitute a physical impair-
ment,29 citing the interpretive ADA guidelines 30 and case law.31 The
within the meaning of the ADA. However, Soodman v. Wildman et. al., No. 95. C
3834, 1997 WL 106257 (N.D. Ill. February 10, 1997), Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996), and Erickson v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995), all hold that reproduction does consti-
tute a major life activity. The court in Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., N-A.,
123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997), remains uncertain: "We agree that procreation is a
fundamental human activity, but are not certain that it is one of the major life
activities contemplated by the ADA." Id. at 170 (emphasis in original). See infra
note 76 for reference to legal scholarship concerning this issue.
25. Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir. 1997)(citing
Memorandum of Douglas M. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Att'y General, Off. of Legal
Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept 27, 1988)).
26. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2200-01 (1998).
27. See id. at 2201.
28. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934
(1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
29. See id. at 585.
30. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (1997). Subsection (iii) of the impairment definition
under § 36.104(1) states, "[tihe phrase physical or mental impairment includes,
. . HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)."
31. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), cites the following cases to support its
argument that HIV is a physical impairment under the ADA- Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir.
1990); EEOC v. Chemtech Int'l Corp., 1995 WL 608355 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 1995);
Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich.
1994); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Doe v. Kohn Nast &
Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-20 (E.D. Pa. 1994); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F.
Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568
[Vol. 77:206
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court found that reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA
by focusing on the fundamental nature of reproduction and also by
concluding that the interpretive guidelines that listed major life activ-
ities (but did not include reproduction) were merely an illustrative
rather than exhaustive list.32 Finally, the District Court found the
required substantial limitation. The court noted, "[b]y requiring an
individual's physical or mental impairment to substantially limit a
major life activity, the statute does not contemplate a complete inabil-
ity of that individual to engage in a particular major life activity."33
Abbott was substantially limited in her ability to reproduce because
childbirth poses health risks to an HIV-positive mother. An HIV-posi-
tive mother might infect her child through pregnancy, childbirth, or
breastfeeding. The court also found that Abbott's ability to reproduce
was limited because an HIV-positive mother might die before she
could complete her child's upbringing.3 4 Bragdon appealed the grant
of summary judgment for Abbott.35
The First Circuit similarly agreed that Abbott was disabled under
the ADA's first definition of disability.36 With little discussion, the
First Circuit held that she easily met the requisite physical or mental
impairment required under the ADA.37 Providing support for this
finding were both Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regu-
lations, which state that the term "physical impairment" includes
HIV,38 and case law.3 9 Although the First Circuit acknowledged,
(D.D.C. 1992); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D. Mass. 1991). Although
not cited by the Abbott court, Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541, 545
(E.D.N.C. 1996) similarly holds that HIV infection constitutes a physical
impairment.
32. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934
(1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
33. Id. at 587 (emphasis in original).
34. See id.
35. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998).
36. It is interesting to note that Abbott did not claim that she was regarded as having
a disability, which is another prong of the disability definition. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(C) (1994). Dr. Bragdon's proposed differential treatment of Abbott
(i.e. filling her cavity in the hospital instead of at the office) supports the argu-
ment that Bragdon regarded her as having a disability, and thus was disabled
under the ADA. The United States, in its intervenor-plaintiff brief, did assert
that Abbott was disabled under this third prong because "society commonly re-
gards individuals who are infect with HIV as having substantially limiting im-
pairments." Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938, n.2 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). However, the circuit court did not address that conten-
tion. For an extensive treatment of the "regarded as" prong of the disability defi-
nition, see Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., NA., 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996),
rev'd en banc, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
37. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998).
38. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996).
1998]
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"[tihe question of whether reproduction in large constitutes a major
life activity under the ADA is not free from doubt,"40 it ultimately con-
cluded that reproduction was a major life activity. Using the diction-
ary definitions of "major" as "greater than others in importance or
rank," the court decided that the significance of reproduction, "which
is both the source of all life and one of life's most important activities,"
easily satisfies the major life activity requirement.41 Bragdon argued
that reproduction was a lifestyle choice and that major life activities
do not include lifestyle choices, or "activities that many people decide
never to do."42 The First Circuit rejected this argument and further
did not agree that an activity must be done frequently,43 or univer-
sally to constitute a major life activity.44 Bragdon next argued that
Abbott was not disabled "unless reproduction [was] a major life activ-
ity for her."45 Although the court recognized the need for an individu-
alized inquiry into whether a person was disabled, it rejected the
notion that "a corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the connection
between the plaintiff and the major life activity" was required.4 6 That
is, the plaintiff need not show that the major life activity was espe-
cially important to her.4 7 Finally, the First Circuit held that Abbott
had demonstrated that her HIV infection substantially limited her
major life activity of reproduction. Although Bragdon conceded that a
pregnant mother without AZT drug therapy faces a 25% risk of trans-
mitting HIV to her child and an 8% chance with AZT, he argued that
the issue of a substantial limitation was still unresolved and thus
should preclude summary judgment.48 The court again rejected Brag-
don's argument:
We are unconvinced. No reasonable juror could conclude that an 8% risk of
passing an incurable, debilitating, and inevitably fatal disease to one's child is
39. The Abbott court cited Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) and
Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990).
40. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998).
41. Id. at 939-940.
42. Id. For his lifestyle choice argument, Bragdon cited Krauel v. Iowa Methodist
Med. Ctr, 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 n.1 (S.D. Iowa 1995)("Some people choose not to
have children, but all people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk,
see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, and work, unless a handicap or illness prevents
them from doing so."), affd, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
43. See Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La.
1995)("Reproduction is not an activity engaged in with the same degree of fre-
quency as the listed activities of walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working.")
44. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998).
45. Id. at 941 (emphasis in original).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 942.
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not a substantial restriction on reproductive activity .... In addition, Ms.
Abbott faces the unfortunate reality that even if she gives birth to a healthy
child, she probably will not live long enough to complete the task of raising the
child to adulthood. We thus hold that HIV-positive status is a physical im-
pairment that substantially limits a fecund woman's major life activity of re-
production. Ms. Abbott therefore is disabled within the purview of the
ADA.4 9
Bragdon appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which held
that HIV infection, even in its asymptomatic stage, constitutes a disa-
bility within the purview of the ADA. In Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, the Court discussed at length the physical effects of HIV in-
fection on the hemic and lymphatic systems, citing various medical
and scientific studies, and ultimately held that these detrimental ef-
fects constituted a physical impairment. 50
The Supreme Court noted that the ADA does not become operative
unless the impairment limits a major life activity.51 The major life
activity at issue in Bragdon was reproduction. The Court easily re-
solved the issue: "We ask, then, whether reproduction is a major life
activity. We have little difficulty concluding that it is."52 The Court
quoted from the First Circuit's opinion, which held that the meaning
of the term "major" denotes both comparative importance and signifi-
49. Id. Two commentators view the court's holding that "1IV-positive status is a
physical impairment that substantially limits a fecund woman's major life activ-
ity of reproduction" as quite problematic. See Wendy E. Parmet and Daniel J.
Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New Social Construction
of HIV, 23 Am. J.L. & MED. 7 (1997). Parmet and Jackson argue:
Thus, the court's conclusion that Ms. Abbott was disabled was based
in large part on the fortuity of her own fertility. Should other courts
adopt this analysis requiring an individualized demonstration of how
HIV status affects an individual's own reproductive intentions, the fate
of many individuals who cannot show that their HIV status had caused
them to alter their childbearing plans will be uncertain. For example, a
woman who had become HIV positive after menopause could not satisfy
the court as to her "fecundity" .... Men and women who chose to have
children after being infected could find themselves in a similar predica-
ment. And, of course, many gay men might find it difficult to explain
how they have altered their reproductive plans because of their infec-
tion. Thus, the protection for asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals
might be quite haphazard at best and depends on a circumstance-the
plaintiffs fertility and reproductive intentions-that really has nothing
to do with the discrimination at issue.
Id. at 35-36.
50. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202-04 (1998).
51. See id. at 2204.
52. Id. at 2205. The Court did mention that confining the discussion to reproduction
may seem legalistic: 'We have little doubt that had different parties brought the
suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial limi-
tations on other major life activities." Id. However, since the court of appeals
had considered reproduction as a major life activity and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on that question, the Supreme Court limited its discussion to
reproduction. See id.
19981
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cance. 53 Bragdon argued that Congress intended the term "major life
activity" to encompass only "those aspects of a person's life which have
a public, economic, or daily character."54 EEOC regulations define
major life activities as "functions such as caring for one's self, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning and working."55 The Court rejected this argument, noting
that the regulations which defined "major life activity" included activi-
ties such as caring for one's self and performing manual tasks, which
do not have a public or economic character. 5 6 Further, the Court
noted, "[tihe Rehabilitation Act regulations support the inclusion of
reproduction as a major life activity, since reproduction could not be
regarded as less important than working and learning."57
Finally, the Court held that HIV infection constituted a substantial
limitation on reproduction. The Court stated that the possibility of
transmission during sexual relations and during gestation and child-
birth posed substantial limitations on reproductive activity.5 S Brag-
don pointed out drug therapy reduced the risk of perinatal
transmission to 8%, but the Court rejected this argument: "It cannot
be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and
fatal disease to one's child does not represent a substantial limitation
on reproduction."59 The Court continued,
[tihe Act addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter
inabilities. Conception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim
but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health. This meets the defini-
tion of a substantial limitation. The decision to reproduce carries economic
and legal consequences as well. There are added costs for antiretroviral ther-
apy, supplemental insurance, and long-term health care for the child who
must be examined and, tragic to think, treated for the infection. The laws of
some States, moreover, forbid persons infected with HIV from having sex with
others, regardless of consent.... In the end, the disability definition does not
turn on personal choice. When significant limitations result from the impair-
ment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable. For
the statistical and other reasons we have cited, of course, the limitations on
reproduction may be insurmountable here.... Respondent's H1V infection is
53. See id. (quoting from Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)).
54. Id.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997).
56. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 2206. The Court cited statistics which indicated that female to male
transmission of HIV was 20-25% and mother to child transmission was 25%.
59. Id. There was some debate about the relevance of the 8% figure. Although the
Court declined to resolve the issue, it did note, "[tihe Solicitor General questions
the relevance of the 8% figure, pointing to regulatory language requiring the sub-
stantiality of a limitation to be assessed without regard to available mitigating
measures." Id. The Solicitor General cited 28 C.F.R pt. 36, app. B, p. 611 (1997)
and 29 C.F.R pt. 1630, app., p. 351 (1997).
[Vol. 77:206
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a physical impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, as the
ADA defines it.
6 0
III. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in Bragdon constitutes a dangerous expansion
of the ADA. Although asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals suffer
from a physical impairment of their hemic and lymphatic systems,6 '
this impairment, in and of itself, does not substantially limit a major
life activity. Therefore, asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals should
not be classified as disabled under the ADA's first definition of disabil-
ity. The Bragdon court effectively found a physical impairment, but
its basis for finding a substantial limitation on a major life activity is
questionable.
A. Physical Impairment Present
The Supreme Court, after citing various medical and scientific
studies, concluded that Abbott clearly fulfilled the physical or mental
impairment element of her ADA claim:
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the in-
fected person's white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold that it
is an impairment from the moment of infection.... [Ifnfection with HIV
causes immediate abnormalities in a person's blood, and the infected person's
white cell count continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even
when the attack is concentrated in the lymph nodes. In light of these facts,
H1IV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant
and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems
from the moment of infection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regu-
latory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.6 2
60. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2206-07 (1998)(citations omitted). The Court
also cited numerous administrative and judicial precedents which have similarly
construed the ADA. See id. at 2207-09.
61. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) and Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf,
P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
62. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998). See Hernandez v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Gates v. Rowland, 39
F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992); Cortes v.
McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1996). But see Ennis v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir 1995)(although the child
was HIV positive, the court found, "[t]here is no evidence in the record that A J. is
impaired to any degree.... "); Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., NA., 123 F.3d
156 (4th Cir. 1997), similarly held that the asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff
was not physically impaired for the purposes of the ADA. The Runnebaum court
first cited the dictionary meaning of impairment: "to 'make worse by or as if by
diminishing in some material respect.'" Id. at 168 (quoting WEBSTER's NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 603 (1986)). The Runnebaum court then concluded,
"Ithe plain meaning of 'impairment' suggests that asymptomatic HIV infection
will never qualify as an impairment: by definition, asymptomatic M1V infection
exhibits no diminishing effects on the individual." Id. at 169. This view is heav-
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B. Reproduction Is Not a Major Life Activity
"An impairment alone is not a disability under the ADA. Rather,
the impairment must be one which substantially limits one or more
major life activities."6 3 Although the lower courts had struggled with
the notion of reproduction as a major life activity,64 the Supreme
Court did not. Rather, it had "little difficulty" concluding that repro-
duction was a major life activity. Relying on the First Circuit's defini-
tion of "major" as denoting significance, the Court simply stated,
"[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.' Re-
production and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the
life process itself."65
The Supreme Court failed to meaningfully analyze why reproduc-
tion should be considered a major life activity. The mere assertion
that it is a "significant" or "important" life activity does not necessarily
mean that it is a "major life activity." Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
concurring and dissenting opinion, noted that the majority had fo-
cused on the first definition of "major", rather than the alternative def-
inition of "greater in quantity, number, or extent."6 6 He concluded the
alternative definition was most consistent with the illustrative list of
major life activities. In addition, although the majority had deemed
the list of major life activities as merely illustrative, it had made "no
attempt to demonstrate that reproduction is a major life activity in the
same sense that 'caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working'
are."67 Rehnquist concluded:
No one can deny that reproductive decisions are important in a person's
life. But so are decisions as to who to marry, where to live, and how to earn
one's living. Fundamental importance of this sort is not the common thread
linking the statute's listed activities. The common thread is rather that the
activities are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence
of a normally functioning individual. They are thus quite different from the
series of activities leading to the birth of a child.6 8
ily criticized in the Runnebaum dissent. The dissent notes that the ADA does not
require "a 'physical impairment' to be outwardly visible or manifest." Id. at 181.
For further discussion on HIV infection as a physical impairment, see Kushen,
supra note 23, at 570-73.
63. Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 773 (E.D.
Tex. 1996).
64. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
65. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998).
66. Id. at 2215 (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 702 (10th ed.
1994))(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 2215 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)).
68. Id. Justice O'Connor similarly expressed doubt that reproduction was a major life
activity:
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that respondent's claim of disa-
bility should be evaluated on an individualized basis and that she has
not proven that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one
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Furthermore, the Court suggested that because reproduction is
"central to the life process itself," it is necessarily a major life activ-
ity.6 9 This rationale is highly problematic. This could logically be in-
terpreted to mean that every physical or bodily function is a "major
life activity." All the bodily systems working together are central to
the life process, so if one suffers a minor impairment in the digestive
system, one could rationally argue that his or her major life activity of
digestion is substantially limited.70
Although the Supreme Court did not provide a detailed analysis
why reproduction should be considered a major life activity, several
lower courts have. In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,71 the district court
held that reproduction was a major life activity because the reproduc-
tive system was listed in the ADA regulations:
If a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system constitutes an im-
pairment under the ADA, then "it logically follows from that instruction that
reproduction is a covered major life activity. Otherwise, it would make no
sense to include the reproductive system among the systems that can have an
ADA physical impairment." 7 2
However, as Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc.7 3 points out, the
ADA and its regulations indicate that the impairment itself and the
major life activity it substantially limits must be separate and dis-
tinct.74 The mere fact that the reproductive system could be impaired
does not mean that reproduction is a major life activity. The Zatarain
court would not allow the plaintiff "to bootstrap a finding of substan-
tial limitation of a major life activity on to a finding of an impairment.
To articulate plaintiffs analysis, she claims to have a reproductive dis-
order that interferes with the major life activity of reproduction,
which is substantially limited because of her disorder."75
The divergent holdings of Pacourek and Zatarain have generated a
significant amount of scholarship.76 The ADA and its regulations bet-
or more of her major life activities. In my view, the act of giving birth to
a child, while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not
generally the same as the representative major life activities of all per-
sons- "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working"-listed in regula-
tions relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 2217
(1998)(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(internal
citations omitted).
69. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998).
70. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71. 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
72. Id. at 801 (quoting Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D.
Ill. 1994)).
73. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995).
74. See id. at 243.
75. Id.
76. See Deborah Y. Dallman, The Lay View of What "Disability" Means Must Give
Way to What Congress Says It Means: Infertility as a "Disability" Under the
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ter support the Zatarain argument. First of all, the ADA itself specifi-
cally indicates that the impairment and the major life activity are
distinct considerations. 77 If Congress did intend that a finding of a
physical impairment was enough and from that one could infer a sub-
stantial limitation of a major life activity, the words following the
term impairment "that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual"78 would be superfluous. Congress in-
cluded those additional elements in defining disability and therefore
the elements of a substantial limitation on a major life activity must
be met.
Pacourek asserts that if reproduction was not a major life activity,
the inclusion of the reproductive system in the EEOC guidelines
"would make no sense."79 However, the holding of Pacourek extends
the ADA illogically when applied to the other body systems in the
EEOC list. The EEOC specifies that physical or mental impairment
means "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respira-
tory; including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive;
genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;.. ."80
Some examples point out the danger in Pacourek's logic. First, as-
sume an individual suffers from borderline anemia, 8 ' a disorder of the
hemic system, and fatigues easily, but is able to work and live a full
life. Under Pacourek, the individual is disabled because the major life
activity of producing sufficient red blood cells and hemoglobin is sub-
stantially limited by the anemia impairment. One would argue that if
anemia was not meant to be included as a disability, then why include
the hemic system in the regulations? A second example concerns a
stressed out working mother who suffers from irritable bowel syn-
Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371 (1996); Bonny Gil-
bert, Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treat-
ment, 63 DEF. CouNs. J. 42 (1996); Katie Cook Morgan, Should Infertility Be a
Covered Disability under the ADA?: A Question for Congress, Not the Courts, 65
U. CIN. L. REv. 963 (1997); Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infer-
tility: Fertile Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1051 (1996). For further discussion on
the Zatarain case, Abbott v. Bragdon, and reproduction as a major life activity,
see Parmet and Jackson, supra note 49 at 26-35. For another article asserting
that infertility is a disability, see Rhonda S. Tischler, Infertility: A Forgotten Dis-
ability, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 249 (1994).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
78. Id.
79. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. fll 1996).
80. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(i) (1997).
81. Anemia is defined as "a condition in which the blood is deficient in red blood cells,
in hemoglobin, or in total volume." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY 85 (9th ed. 1991).
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drome and indigestion when her stress peaks. Once again, applying
Pacourek, this individual is disabled because her irritable bowel syn-
drome impairs her major life activity of digestion. One would have to
conclude that if irritable bowel syndrome and indigestion were not
meant to be included as a disabilities, then why include the digestive
system in the regulations? In essence, almost any impairment could
be deemed a disability because the impairment substantially limited
the major life activity that the bodily system was supposed to
perform.8 2
Commentators have criticized Zatarain for its interpretation that
the major life activity be separate from the impairment and its rejec-
tion of "bootstrapping."8 3 One argues,
[the Zatarain court] conclude[s] the claim of having a reproductive disorder
that interferes with reproduction to be circular and unpersuasive because it
bootstrapped the limitation from the impairment. But this seems to be shaky
use of terminology ... It would be interesting to see if this court would hold
that being visionless because of an impairment to the visual organs also was
bootstrapping. 84
In reference to the bootstrapping argument, another commentator
notes: "By arguing this, the Zatarain court makes the bizarre sugges-
tion that the closer the relationship between the impairment and the
major life activity that is limited, the less likely that one is to have a
disability under the ADA!"85
However, these criticisms leveled at Zatarain are without merit.
The ADA regulations specify several major life activities, including
seeing. The regulations state: "The phrase major life activities means
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."8 6
Thus, because seeing is listed as a major life activity, one need not
bootstrap from a finding of an impairment of the special sense organs
to ultimately conclude that seeing is a major life activity. By virtue of
"seeing" being specified in the regulations, that part of the disability
inquiry ends. Also, Zatarain's rejection of the bootstrapping argu-
82. In Parmet and Jackson's article, supra note 49, the authors refer to this applica-
tion of logic in an early argument of AIDS/HIV as a disability under the Rehabili-
tation Act. The authors cited Arthur Leonard's argument that "persons with
AIDS are handicapped as a matter of law because the 'ability to fight infection
and preserve health is logically a major life function.' Hence their infection con-
stitutes a physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of
infection fighting." Id. at 12 (quoting Arther Leonard, Employment Discrimina-
tion Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 681, 691 (1985)). How-
ever, this argument again takes the finding of an impairment and assumes a
major life activity. See id. at 14.
83. Bonny Gilbert, supra note 76 at 47.
84. Id.
85. Morgan, supra note 76 at 983.
86. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1997).
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ment does not mean that there cannot be a close relationship between
the impairment and the major life activity substantially limited.
Rather, Zatarain seeks to ensure that every finding of an impairment
does not automatically result in the finding of a limited major life ac-
tivity. Just because one has an impairment does not mean that the
impairment necessarily limits any major life activity.
Nonetheless, the proponents of Pacourek and its progeny might
continue to argue that if reproduction were not a major life activity,
then why is the reproductive system included in the EEOC listing?
Rehnquist's opinion in Bragdon provides the answer. There are other
impairments of the reproductive system that affect major life activi-
ties, such as working, that do not necessarily include the physical act
of reproduction. Reproductive disorders such as endometriosis87 or
dysmenorrhea8S could be so painful that they substantially limit a wo-
man's ability to engage in major life activities like walking and work-
ing. Rehnquist also noted the disabling effect of cancer of the
reproductive organs.8 9 Other impairments of the reproductive system
which do not necessarily lead to infertility but are painful enough to
interfere with a woman's working life include cystic-ovarian disease,
uterine tumors, and pelvic inflammatory disease. 90
Rehnquist pointed out the failure of the Court to discuss whether
reproduction was a major life activity for Abbott herself. He noted,
"the ADA's definition of a 'disability' requires that the major life activ-
ity at issue be one 'of such individual.' . . . [There is not a shred of
record evidence indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV,
respondent's major life activities included reproduction .... "91
Rehnquist's insistence on an inquiry into whether or not the major
life activity claimed was actually of significance to the plaintiff is sup-
ported both in statute9 2 and in common sense. The ADA regulations
focus on the need for an individualized inquiry:
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather
on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impair-
ments may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depend-
87. Endometriosis is defined as "the presence of functioning endometrial tissue in
places where it is not normally found. The endometrium is "the mucous lining of
the uterus." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 411 (9th ed. 1991).
88. Dysmenorrhea is defined as "painful menstruation." WEBSTER'S NnTH NEW CoI,
LEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 391 (9th ed. 1991).
89. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998); see also Morgan, supra note
76, at 982 n.128.
90. Telephone Interview with Peg Schneider, a Physician's Assistant who works at a
sexually transmitted diseases clinic (Oct. 5, 1997).
91. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2214-15 (1998)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)(citation omitted).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994), cited in Bragdon v. Abbott 118 S. Ct. 2196,
2215 (1998)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing on the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments
that combine to make the impairment disabling or any number of other
factors.
93
Without this individualized inquiry, absurdities would naturally re-
sult. For example, homosexual men or menopausal women that are
asymptomatic HIV positive could similarly argue that their major life
activity of reproduction is limited by their infection. 94 However, since
sexual orientation or age, not their infection, has precluded reproduc-
tion, any argument that reproduction is a major life activity for them
is clearly unreasonable.
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court failed to meaningfully analyze
whether reproduction is a major life activity, instead relying on bare
assertion that because an activity is of "comparative importance" or
"central to the life process itself," it is necessarily a major life activity.
The Supreme Court also neglected to determine if reproduction was,
in fact, a major life activity for Abbott. These failures could well result
in almost all physical or mental impairments being deemed "disabili-
ties," thus negating the ADA's disability definition. Further, absurdi-
ties may result, as individuals are being labeled as "disabled" because
their impairment substantially limits a "major life activity" that holds
no particular importance for them.
C. No Substantial Limitation on Reproduction
Assuming for the purpose of argument that reproduction does con-
stitute a major life activity, the Bragdon holding is still problematic
because the physical impairment of HIV-positive infection itself does
not substantially limit reproduction. Rather, it is the individual's re-
action to the disease which limits reproduction. 9 5
The Bragdon Court determined that a major life activity was sub-
stantially limited if significant limitations resulted from the impair-
ment, even if these limitations were not insurmountable.9 6 Abbott's
HIV-positive status served as such a limitation because of the risk of
sexual transmission and perinatal transmission. Even if treated with
AZT, she still faced an 8% risk of infecting her child with HIV. The
Court maintained, "[it cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8%
risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not
93. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j), app., at 350 (1997). After focusing on an individualized de-
termination, the regulations continue, albeit inconsistently: "Other impair-
ments, however, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting." Id.
Without further analysis on why HIV infection poses a substantial limitation,
this statement regarding HIV is at odds with the ADA's individualized inquiry
requirement and seems to have little merit.
94. See Parmet and Jackson, supra note 49.
95. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N-A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
96. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2206 (1998).
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represent a substantial limitation on reproduction."97 However, the
Bragdon court ignored the fact that the infection itself is not limiting
her reproduction. Instead, the Court focused on Ms. Abbott's personal
reactions and decisions regarding the infection that might limit her
reproductive choices.
Rehnquist also noted this, pointing out that an HIV infected indi-
vidual could still engage in reproductive activities and the choice not
to engage in these activities was not a substantial limitation: "While
individuals infected with HIV may choose not to engage in these activ-
ities, there is no support in language, logic, or our case law for the
proposition that such voluntary choices constitute a 'limit' on one's
own life activities."9 8
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A.99 noted the distinc-
tion between being unable to reproduce and choosing not to reproduce.
In Runnebaum, an asymptomatic HIV-positive employee claimed he
was discriminatorily discharged from his job because of his HIV sta-
tus.100 Amici for the plaintiff argued that his asymptomatic HIV-posi-
tive status "'substantially limits ... procreation and intimate sexual
relations ... because of concerns that the offspring or partner will be
infected with the virus.'"loi The Runnebaum court rejected this argu-
ment, citing a Department of Justice memorandum which concluded:
"'[T]here is nothing inherent in the infection which actually prevents
either procreation or intimate relations."'102 Rather, "it is 'the con-
science or normative judgment of the particular infected person,' not
the impairment, that substantially limits procreation and intimate
sexual relations."103 The Runnebaum court read the language that an
impairment must substantially limit a major life activity as requiring
a causal nexus between the physical effect of the impairment and one of the
major life activities. For example, a paralyzed individual's paralysis is what
substantially limits his ability to walk, and a deaf person's deafness is what
substantially limits his ability to hear. In the case of asymptomatic HIV infec-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2216 (1998)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in party and dissenting in part).
99. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
100. See id. at 163.
101. Id. at 171. The argument that HIV-positive infection substantially limits procre-
ation, etc., was accepted by several other courts, including- Abbott v. Bragdon,
107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Hernandez v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America, 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Anderson v. Gus
Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774 n.24 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Doe
v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992)(applying the Rehabilita-
tion Act).
102. Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir. 1997)(citing
Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Att'y General, Off. of
Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27,
1988), reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 641 at 405:4-7).
103. Id.
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tion, however, an individual's reaction to the knowledge of his infection-not
the infection itself-is what, if anything, substantially limits procreation and
intimate sexual relations.10 4
The causal nexus requirement in Runnebaum makes sense. One's
reaction to his or her impairment is not enough. If the ADA's defini-
tion of disability means to include the situation where one's reaction,
rather than one's actual impairment, substantially limits a major life
activity, the definition could have easily been written so as to justify
that conclusion. Such a definition could read as follows: Disability
means a physical or mental impairment or one's reaction to one's own
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.
Obviously, the ADA was not drafted this way. Therefore, such a
meaning should not be added to the legislative definition.
Continuing with his substantial limitation analysis in Bragdon,
Rehnquist distinguished present from future limitations:
[Abbott] contends that her ability to reproduce is limited because "the fatal
nature of HIV infection means that a parent is unlikely to live long enough to
raise and nurture the child to adulthood."... But the ADA's definition of
disability is met only if the alleged impairment substantially "limits" (present
tense) a major life activity .... Asymptomatic HIV does not presently limit
respondent's ability to perform any of the tasks necessary to bear or raise a
child. Respondent's argument, taken to its logical extreme, would render
every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled'
here and now because of some possible future effects. 1 05
The reasoning the Bragdon majority articulated in support of its
holding is too expansive and vague; it opens Pandora's box to claims of
disability based on fear of future consequences rather than impair-
ments which actually cause the substantial limitation of a major life
activity. The Bragdon reasoning rests on the proposition that one's
own reaction to an impairment, rather than the impairment itself, can
substantially limit a major life activity. When this reasoning is natu-
rally extended, then those carriers of genetic diseases, who themselves
suffer no symptoms, may also claim to be disabled under the ADA.106
These individuals are not physically incapable of bearing children, but
the possibility of passing on a genetic disease to their offspring serves
as a deterrent to reproduction. Those with a genetic susceptibility to
heart disease and cancer 10 7 might similarly claim that they too are
104. Id. at 172.
105. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2216 (1998)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)(quoting Brief for Respondent at 22).
106. See id. For a provocative article regarding genetic discrimination and the ADA,
specifically arguing that presymptomatic individuals with Huntington's disease
should be classified as per se disabled under the ADA, see Brian R. Gin, Genetic
Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 97
COLUm L. REv. 1406 (1997).
107. But see EEOC Interpretative Guidance to the Federal Regulations (specifying
that the impairment definition "does not include characteristic predisposition to
illness or disease." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. at 350 (1997)). For further discus-
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
disabled because they fear not living to see the child mature.1 0 8 One
commentator argues that this fear of a premature death might even
constitute a mental impairment under the ADA.109
This reasoning is all based on future possibilities, rather than pres-
ent disabilities. The ADA does not protect those who may become dis-
abled in the future; rather it protects those who are now disabled. The
Executive Director of the American Society of Law, Medicine, and Eth-
ics, Larry Gostin, suggests that the ADA's definition of disability be
amended to include "having a genetic or medically identified potential
of, or predisposition toward, such an impairment."1 10 However, such
an expansive definition would necessarily include almost all Ameri-
cans because most people have some genetic condition or predisposi-
tion to some type of impairment. The ADA will cease to protect only
the truly disabled; rather, those with possible impairments will also
seek its protection, rendering the Act's definition of disability virtually
worthless.
Furthermore, even if one concludes that the possibility of passing a
disease onto a child limits the decision to have a family, how likely
does the possibility of transmission need to be? Bragdon suggests that
an 8% risk serves as a substantial limitation on reproduction.11l Sub-
stantial means "important; considerable in quantity; significantly
large."'1 2 Using this usual interpretation, an 8% risk is not suffi-
sion on the ADA's application to genetic conditions, see Gin, supra note 106;
Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 (1991);
Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic Defect is a Disability Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Preventing Genetic Discrimination by Employers, 1 ANNALs
HEALTH L. 107 (1992); Frances H. Miller and Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints,
Employer Cost-Cutting and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADnzm. L.
REV. 369, 369-70 (Summer 1994); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in
Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 HousT. L. REv. 23
(1992).
108. See Gin, supra note 106. Gin argues that cancer is distinguishable from Hunting-
ton's disease because all those who carry the Huntington's gene will someday
develop the disease, whereas those with a predisposition to cancer might develop
cancer of differing severities, or escape cancer completely. See id. at 1415.
109. See id. In the context of Huntington's disease, Gin argues that this fear of dying
could constitute a mental impairment:
But while it is true that presymptomatic Huntington's individuals may
be physically able to engage in any activity they choose, they are never-
theless psychologically burdened by the fact that they will almost cer-
tainly die in mid-life.... [Tihe ADA does not require that a disabled
person be substantially limited by a physical impairment; mental im-
pairments may also be substantially limiting-and certainty of death by
mid-life is substantially limiting enough to make a person forgo the ex-
perience of having a child.
Id. at 1426-27 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 1420.
111. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2206 (1998); see also supra note 59.
112. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1170 (9th ed. 1991).
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ciently large enough to merit being called substantial. Rather, such a
risk could be deemed minimal. One might conclude that other genetic
diseases, such as Huntington's disease, with its parent-child transmis-
sion rate of 50%, does in fact clearly meet this substantial limitation
requirement, 1i 3 whereas HIV transmission is significantly less and
should not be deemed substantial.
Moreover, this absence of a substantial limitation regarding repro-
duction in asymptomatic HIV-positive women is supported by the ar-
gument that counseling HIV-positive women to forego childbearing is
itself a violation of the ADA.114 Taunya Lovell Banks argues at
length that discouraging such women not to have children "constitutes
separate, different, unequal, and less effective counseling than that
received by able-bodied women making reproductive choices."ii5 Fur-
thermore, she argues that denying HIV-positive women access to "re-
productive-related services, including abortion and infertility services,
constitutes separate, different, unequal, and less effective medical
treatment based on a protected physical disability in violation of the
ADA."116 Although Banks assumes that HIV-positive status is neces-
sarily a protected disability, her arguments further support the asser-
tion that HIV infection itself does not substantially limit reproduction.
Rather, some asymptomatic HIV-positive women "will consciously
want to become pregnant"1 7 and some will indeed become pregnant.
There is nothing about the infection itself which substantially limits
reproductive activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unfortunate reality is that almost a million Americans are in-
fected with HIV.1i Although many remain asymptomatic for several
years, they still face the chilling prospect of death from AIDS. These
individuals deserve society's respect and sympathy as their disease
progresses to and through the symptomatic stage. However, manipu-
lating the first definition of disability under the ADA, i.e., "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits [a] major life ac-
tivit[y]"119 is not the way to engender this compassion.
113. See Gin, supra note 106, at 1416.
114. See Taunya Lovell Banks, TheAmericans with DisabilitiesAct and the Reproduc-
tive Rights of HlV-Infected Women, 3 Tax. J. WOMEN & L. 57 (1994).
115. Id. at 64.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 89.
118. See Burr, supra note 10.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
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Asymptomatic HIV infection is not a disability because although
HIV-positive individuals are clearly impaired,120 this impairment
does not substantially limit any major life activity. The Supreme
Court's reasoning that reproduction is central to the life process, and
is therefore a major life activity, is simply too vague. Further, con-
cluding that reproduction is a major life activity because the EEOC
regulations list the reproductive system as a body system capable of
impairment is a circular argument, and "would allow [the plaintiff] to
bootstrap a finding of substantial limitation of a major life activity on
to a finding of an impairment."i 21 Such an argument, logically ex-
tended, would mean that any form of physical or mental impairment,
no matter how unconnected with any reasonable understanding of the
term "major life activity," would ultimately be a disability under the
ADA, because the impairment would substantially limit the major life
activity the bodily system was supposed to perform.
Even assuming reproduction is a major life activity, the physical
impairment does not substantially limit reproduction. It is the indi-
vidual's reaction to the infection, rather than the disease itself which
causes many to forgo reproductive activities. Asymptomatic HIV-posi-
tive persons can still reproduce, but many might choose not to because
they fear that they will transmit the disease to their partner or their
unborn child, or that they will impair their own immune system, or
because they fear dying before they can complete the job of childrear-
ing. However, such fear of future consequences is not sufficient to
show a substantial limitation because the physical impairment, not
the person's reaction to it, must substantially limit the major life
activity.
Rather than dangerously manipulating the first definition of disa-
bility under the ADA, the more reasonable argument that an asymp-
tomatic HIV-positive individual could make for a successful ADA
claim is that he or she is regarded as disabled.122 The Supreme Court
120. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998); see also Runnebaum v. Na-
tionsbank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 181 (4th Cir. 1997)(dissenting opin-
ion)(citing Letter from C. Everett Koop, M.D. Surgeon General, to Douglas W.
Kmiec, Acting Assistant Att'y General, Off. of Legal Counsel, Department of Jus-
tice, reprinted in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 641 at 405:18, 405:19).
This memorandum can also be located at Americans with Disabilities Act, 1989:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, Senate Labor and Human
Resources Comm, 101st Cong. 338-66 (1989)(memorandum of Douglas M. Kmiec).
121. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual- . . . (C)being regarded as having such an impairment.") At the
Supreme Court, Abbott argued alternatively that she was "regarded as" disabled,
but because she had failed to assert this argument at the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court declined to address this issue. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct.
2196, 2214, n.1 (1998)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also supra note 36. For cases applying the "regarded as" disabled definition,
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in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,123 in applying the Reha-
bilitation Act to a suit involving a schoolteacher with recurrent tuber-
culosis who was fired from her job,124 noted that
[bly amending the definition... to include not only those who are actually
physically impaired, but also those who are as regarded as impaired and who,
as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress ac-
knowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of
public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness.
1 2 5
Although the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the issue
about whether an HIV carrier had a physical impairment or could be
regarded as disabled,12 6 such arguments can be made.12 7 Using the
"regarded as" prong of the disability definition serves to protect the
discrimination claims of HIV-positive individuals,128 without danger-
ously expanding the logical meanings of the terms "major life activity"
and "substantially limits" contained within the ADA's first definition
of disability.
Although Bragdon v. Abbott answered some of the questions with
which federal courts had struggled, several key issues remain un-
resolved. The Court specifically decided not to address whether HIV
infection is a per se disability under the ADA.129 Reproduction was
the major life activity at issue here,130 but query whether HIV-posi-
tive homosexual men or menopausal women could similarly be found
disabled within the ADA's purview. Since their reproductive capabili-
ties are limited by sexual orientation and age, not HIV infection,13 1
these individuals would have to find another "major life activity" that
is substantially limited by their HIV infection. This might prove to be
a very difficult task with the treatments available, the duration of the
see Runnebaum v. NationsBank ofMd., NA, 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'd
en banc, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.
Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994). See, e.g., Kushen, supra note 23.
123. 480 U.S. 273 (1986); see also Kushen, supra note 23 for his discussion of this case.
124. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1986).
125. Id. at 284.
126. See id. at 282 n.7.
127. One would argue that because of others' reactions to the claimant's physical im-
pairment, the claimant was substantially limited in a major life activity (like
working). See supra notes 36 and 122 and the authorities cited therein; see also
Villalba, supra note 6; Kushen, supra note 23, discussing School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
128. Such arguments are beyond the scope of this Note, but are interesting points for
continued exploration.
129. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998).
130. The Court noted that Abbott and numerous amici had argued about "IVs
profound impact on almost every phase of the infected person's life," but the
Court limited its discussion to reproduction. Id. at 2205.
131. See Parmet and Jackson, supra note 49.
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asymptomatic phase, and the ability of many HIV-positive individuals
to live a normal life.
In discussing the presence of a substantial limitation, the Court
held, "[i]n the end, the disability definition does not turn on personal
choice."132 However, Bragdon v. Abbott establishes that the disability
definition does indeed turn on personal choice. Abbott voluntarily
chose not to bear children. Her infection did not limit her; her reac-
tion to the infection did. With Bragdon as precedent, one who has a
genetic marker can similarly argue that his or her ability to reproduce
is substantially limited,1 33 and therefore, the individual is disabled
within the purview of the ADA. In an attempt to protect HIV-positive
individuals from discrimination, the Court dangerously stretched the
term "disability." The Court has now opened up the floodgates to
countless lawsuits involving possibilities and probabilities, rather
than disabilities. Under the reasoning of Bragdon, fear of future con-
sequences may be enough to render an individual "disabled" under the
ADA.
Theresa A. Schneider '99
132. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2206 (1998).
133. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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